Since the beginning of the transformation process, the Mongolian press has repeatedly asked questions about the political elite in the country. "Is there an elite in Mongolia at all?" "To what extent did this emerge as a new elite after 1990?" "Who actually belongs to it?" "How corrupt is the elite?" "What role do the oligarchs often mentioned in the media play?"

These and similar questions were always at the centre of their interest. During the 1990s, the discussion of these questions was still essentially limited to the political elite, with a focus on the parties and their networks. But with the increasingly dynamic transition to a market economy, not only the economic but also the political structures changed. This was reflected in the elite discussion during the 2000s, when the interplay between the political and economic elite became more central. Finally, the oligarchs themselves were also discussed, which were understood to mean above all the super-rich of the economic elite. Although they were now being talked about, they remained faceless and anonymous for the time being, but seemed to exert direct influence on politics from the background. Mongolian social scientists took up the elite theme only occasionally. They then more or less limit themselves to the terse statement that there was a change of elites in the "transition years 1989-1990". 

In fact, it must be conceded that questions about the Mongolian elite are by no means so easy to answer, especially since one can hardly fall back on existing scholarly preliminary work and daily life is not very transparent in this question. For this reason, this article will limit itself to initial observations on the political elite and approach the subject matter primarily from a historical perspective. There is a good reason for the latter approach. In Mongolia, there was "democratisation from above" in the late phase of perestroika, which in itself suggests that the MRVP elite had played an important, if not the decisive, role in the process of transformation. It is thus natural to look for the origins of today's Mongolian elite in the socialist system.

Ruling class and political elite under socialism

The Basic Law of the Socialist Mongolian People's Republic, adopted in 1960, had codified the political doctrine prevailing in Mongolia for a long perspective. According to the Basic Law, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MRVP), "oriented in its practical activities to the all-conquering Marxist-Leninist theory", was now considered immovable and seemingly irrevocable as "the leading and orienting force of the state and society."

The internal political organisation of society was directed towards the MRVP according to the centralist principle. This had covered the country with its more than 3,000 structural units as if with spider webs vertically and horizontally at all levels. Everywhere there were dual structures of the party and the state, with the party's structures taking priority in every case and thus having the right to issue instructions to the state's structures. At the top of the power pyramid, as in all other socialist countries, was the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee with its General Secretary at the top. The aforementioned dual structures began in the upper segment of power with the departmental divisions in the apparatus of the Central Committee (CC), which ranked higher than ministries. That is, each head of such a CC department was entitled to issue instructions to the minister of the subordinate departmental ministry. For example, the head of the CC department "International Liaison" was authorised to give instructions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc.

Every state official, including the director of a business enterprise, was considered a leading cadre and therefore had to be a party member. There were no exceptions to this rule. The number of party members was high. Around the time of the fall of communism, there were probably about 100,000 members, which, according to the 1989 statistics, corresponded to about 12 per cent of the working population. Who belonged to the party's elite at that time? According to certainly incomplete statistical data from 1989, there were 14,000 leading cadres in material production and 8,500 in the non-productive sector. Together with those in the party, the number of leading cadres probably amounted to a maximum of 30,000. Of course, these 30,000 cadres did not constitute the actual political class. They were only the nomenclature cadres. However, their functioning was vital for the existence of the real political class, especially in the first period of social upheaval during 1989 and 1990. 

The members of the real political class or party and state elite in the strict sense included the General Secretary of the Central Committee and the members and candidates of the Politburo of the Central Committee (CC) of the MRVP, the members of the Secretariat of the CC of the MRVP, the members and candidates of the CC of the MRVP, the heads of departments of the CC apparatus, the members of the Presidium of the Great People's Assembly, as well as other senior office-bearers of parliament, ministers and deputy ministers, chairmen and deputy chairmen of state committees, special office-bearers of the security apparatus, and the party secretaries and administrative chiefs of cities and aimags. All in all, around 150 people may have belonged to this inner circle. The members of this social group were certainly convinced Marxists/Leninists, but in my experience they were also Mongolians and as such very patriotic (nationalists were not allowed at that time). This peculiarity could be explained by the fact that the MRVP itself was the party under whose leadership the modern nation-state had come into being. In addition, there was the not insignificant influence of nationalist networks on party policy, which worked in the background. Such influence could be seen in the time of MRVP General Secretary Yu. Tsedenbal with the networks from the Uvs Aimag. These nationalist networks continued to have an impact even after Yu. Tsedenbal, especially since his successor, J. Batmunkh, also came from the Uvs Aimag. One specific feature was that their activities later took place in an externally closed system of rival networks.

A specific feature of the members of the "150" was undoubtedly that they represented both the ruling class and the political elite of the country. Within the possibilities of the time, they also possessed economic privileges that they did not have to share with anyone else, but which in retrospect and in comparison to the economic position of members of today's political class seem almost paltry. However, it was also essential that they, like their people, had no private property, or none worth mentioning, even though they used some things like summer cottages, official cars, etc. as if they were their own property. Nor should we forget the special pension systems available exclusively to them. Nevertheless, the "150" were not economic actors in the social framework of socialist Mongolia.

The end of socialism and strategies for retaining power

It is easy to understand that at a certain point in time the closest leadership elite of the "150" came to the conclusion that the socialist system was no longer viable. All the important strands of information converged in the inner circle of this leadership elite, the Politburo. In Mongolia, too, information from state security was an important source for the Politburo. While the party reports were glossed over at all levels, the state security reports were considered unadorned and quite objective. The Politburo had gone through a profound process of reflection by the time of the 5th CC meeting in December 1988. MRVP General Secretary J. Batmunkh demanded at this CC meeting a transformation "that would cover the economic and political system and the social and spiritual framework in its entirety."This demand did not represent some empty postulate, but the quintessence of the political thought process in the closest circle of the ruling elite. The message to the Mongolian people was simple and clear: "Socialism cannot be reformed. But we will find a way." The ruling elite had long since realised that this path could not lead past democracy and a market economy. So they started thinking about this path. After all, it was also about maintaining their personal power and privileges. In socialist society, it was clear to everyone that political office, often combined with a state function, determined a person's social position. In a free-market society, on the other hand, private property and one's economic situation played an important role in determining one's social position. The inner circle of power had long since understood this, but still had no real idea of how it could realise the preservation of power and the formation of property together. One thing was clear to him, however: there could be no voluntary renunciation of power. In such a case, the rudder would be given out of the hand. In addition, there was the core question of retaining power: How should the MRVP succeed in maintaining its legitimacy, its legitimate claim to power? 

It should also not be overlooked that securing the retention of power under the specific conditions of Mongolia was a very complex matter. Broader contexts had to be considered. In 1988, Mongolia, which was closely intertwined politically and economically with the USSR, exhibited extremely fragile features in many segments of the state. From the Mongolian point of view, it was worrying that the previous protecting power, the Soviet Union, was also becoming weaker and weaker, while "communist" China, which until recently had been the ideological enemy, was apparently rapidly gaining strength. According to the historical experience of the elite, the Mongolian nation-state had only been able to develop and consolidate itself during the decades since its foundation, despite all the problems, through the close alliance with the Soviet Union. The consequences of a constellation of "weak Mongolia + weak Soviet Union + strong China" raised fears among the leadership. How secure were Mongolia's independence and autonomy without the support of the Soviet Union? Were there ways out, other partners perhaps? The elite leadership came to the conclusion that Mongolia had to try to somehow step out of the previous, primarily geographically determined triangular relationship with Russia and China. To do so, Mongolia needed new partners with power and influence in the world and had to distinguish itself in its state system, especially from China. 

In addition, there was a point that the elite leadership considered to be of existential importance. It could not allow itself to be driven by the course of the event-se. It had to determine the coming process itself wherever possible. It had to carry out a self-directed transformation up to the formation of the political opposition, and it had to do so with a sense of proportion and always within the legal framework so as not to lose its own legitimacy. Only in this way would it succeed in legitimising and maintaining its own position in society in a new way. It understood that it was not the all-important point to fill all leadership functions in persona itself. The decisive point was to preserve the party as an institution and to renew it to such an extent that it could continue to play the decisive role in the formation of the new society. To this end, it was necessary to push ahead with the personnel renewal of the party and the state and, at all stages of the coming path, to take care never to leave the legal framework so as not to lose legitimacy itself and not to allow any anarchic moments to arise within the country. It was quite clear that any form of anarchy would have challenged the concept. 

The MRVP leadership under J. Batmunkh therefore made cautious changes in the government structures and made many personnel reshuffles at the party and state levels. A team led by the lawyer B. Chimid did the preparatory work for the forthcoming total renewal of the legislation. After the full resignation of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MRVP in March 1990, there were hardly any familiar faces left in the leadership positions of the party and the government. New generations, on average between 35 and 45 years old, who had been significantly influenced by the thinking of perestroika, moved up into leadership positions. They were more liberal, non-dogmatic, patriotic and better educated than the old generations of party functionaries. The newly formed opposition formed itself into political parties within half a year from initial civic movements. Quite a few of its very young leaders were the children of former high state and party functionaries from the inner circle of the "150" or belonged to the informal networks of a former organ of power. Almost all opposition leaders had previously been members of the Communist Youth League or even the MRVP. According to insider information, special task forces of the Ministry of Public Security shielded the democratic process, which corresponding forces from the outside repeatedly tried to radicalise according to the motto "In a revolution there must be blood! 

Painful transition

The strategic approach in the inner circle of power, however, was in stark contrast to the internal state of the state apparatus, in which discipline and control were rapidly weakening at this time and in which some leaders began to act according to the motto "Save yourself!". The first private traders began to travel abroad, but they needed a passport and various permits. Leadership cadres of the foreign trade association "Mongolimpex" knew how to help and were soon among the first really solvent entrepreneurs in their country. Those who wanted to do business could not avoid the more or less criminal structures of the shadow economy, which offered themselves both as market and bank but also as procurers of foreign currency. 

In April 1990, the Ministry of Public Security was dissolved and in its place the Main State Police Office and the Main State Security Office were formed. These politically necessary decisions led to the dissolution of entire segments of the State Security structures, such as counter-intelligence. Their employees were among the first state officials to be dismissed. These highly specialised people, who were well networked not only in their own society, were thus among the first to move into the free economy. They did so at a time when they still had full access to the informal networks of their former "trade". It cannot be ruled out that in this situation they also used the shadow economy which they had previously controlled with a state mandate. At the same time, in the spring of 1990, various ministries and state committees were dissolved in the run-up to the first free parliamentary elections, and some of them were quickly reconstituted in a streamlined form. In this case, too, many employees were made redundant who had great insider knowledge. All these people were now under enormous existential pressure and social stress.

With the dissolution of the Ministry of Public Security, the political elite had, albeit belatedly and as strange as it may sound today, liberated itself in a certain sense. Although state security worked on the Soviet model as the party's "sword and shield", it had totally penetrated the MRVP with its networks, contrary to the principle that the party itself could not be the object of observation. Since the MVR was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, absolute loyalty to the Soviet Union was paramount. State security investigated, sometimes in close cooperation with the KGB, who violated this commandment. The political career of such a person was then finally over. In the best case, they only left the political elite and the party, as we know from several cases. The dissolution of the ministry also had the effect of cutting long-established networks with the Soviet "brother organ" which, if they had continued to exist, would have yielded various possibilities for discreetly influencing the Mongolian state.

Shifting power to the executive

The MRVP's special party congress in April 1990 renewed the personnel composition of the party leadership. G. Ochirbat, a disgraced leader under Yu. Tsedenbal, a disgraced former trade union official, was appointed Chairman of the Party. With the exception of Foreign Minister Ts. Gombosüren, previously unknown functionaries from the second row moved up as members of the CC Presidium. The fact that it was mainly unprotected persons who moved up to the party leadership meant that the opposition's attacks directed against specific persons in the party leadership quickly diminished in a relatively short time. The attacks took on a more general verbal character and were no longer linked to concrete faces. The party moved to self-financing, reduced permanent posts in its central apparatus and in its municipal structures. These decisions were neither painless nor without risk. The danger that the party would crumble in this situation, its members scattering in all directions, was great. On the other hand, the socially complicated situation also created a kind of "Wagenburg mentality" that made party members move closer together. The existing compatriot networks in the party also brought party members closer together, with the Western Mongolian networks considered particularly strong and influential. 

Although the party had its claim to power deleted from the Basic Law, it still appeared to ordinary citizens as the intact centre of power. But this was not the case. The "economists' faction" had succeeded in temporarily shifting real power from the party to the state executive.

When the new government was formed after the first democratic parliamentary election, the Small State Assembly had a cabinet formed, led by a prime minister with three deputies and consisting of eleven ministries and a state committee. D. Byambasüren, a member of the former "economist faction" in the MRVP leadership, took over as Prime Minister. Compared to the past, the cabinet had become much younger. The average age was 43. With the exception of the Foreign Minister, who had been in office since 1988, the ministerial posts were held mainly by MRVP members who had worked in their portfolios before 1990, usually as deputy ministers. That is, they possessed professional competence, but also had the advantage of being unknown to the public. The decision of the Small State Assembly on the structure of this government also provided for the possibility of establishing additional authorities/offices at the Council of Ministers in the directions of "economic, social and cultural construction and administrative issues". After their formation, these authorities/offices were not infrequently also used as "catch-all companies" for dismissed civil servants, but also underlined the importance of the executive. Compared to the past, the first democratic government possessed an important advantage: there was no longer a party structure superior to it. The MRVP leadership itself made no real claim to leadership over the government at that time. The government decided for itself and directly and had full freedom of action, especially since the first democratic parliament allowed the executive to act freely under the power of custom. It was the time of transition, also of a certain political vacuum, and almost all incumbents felt that they were only transitional figures in their prominent positions. But they also felt that a well-paid top executive post was necessarily more advantageous than a high-ranking but meagrely remunerated party position because of various access opportunities.

One of the most important tasks of the new cabinet was to initiate and steer the privatisation process. This was in line with the intention of the Inner circle, which saw the need to link political and state offices with "ownership options". To this end, the Prime Minister had a Government Privatisation Commission set up and headed by his 33 year old 1st Deputy Prime Minister Da. Ganbold. Ganbold had studied political economy at Moscow's Lomonosov University and was thus not an economist in the true sense of the word. However, he did not have to be an economist in his new function, because he was not supposed to evaluate economic processes, but to make decisions that were more or less dictated to him by the inner circle. In this first wave of privatisation, the privatisation of the 238 agricultural cooperatives played a special role. Reports from this period say that many cooperative members voted against a hasty dissolution of the cooperatives. But an opaque conglomerate of interest groups, which included former party and youth federation functionaries as well as cooperative chairmen and their relatives, steered and pushed this process on the ground to its advantage. These networks took advantage of the pastoralists' habituation to the old subordination mechanisms to secure privileged access to livestock, pastures, fields and immovable property of the cooperatives. But the use of lawless spaces or the bending and violation of the law were also the order of the day. These people thus not only formed the first major group of owners existing throughout the country, but they also acted as the first lobbyists and financiers of their party, the MRVP. Although this process was slow, it was instrumental in keeping the MRVP firmly anchored in the communal structures of the Aimags, which later, or in perspective, became an important guarantee for this party's electoral victories in parliamentary and local government elections. 

New Basic Law and elite formation

With the adoption of the Democratic Basic Law on 13 January 1992, the legislature created a constitutional framework for the formation of the new political elite that would operate in the legislative, executive and judicial branches.This important issue was thus not left to the discretion of any party, but was codified. The Great State Assembly (mongol. Улсын Их Хурал) had been conceived as a unicameral parliament with 76 man-dates, to be elected by the electorate in "general, free and direct elections". The Basic Law granted this parliament far-reaching powers. For example, it appointed the prime minister and the members of the government. If a quarter of the members of parliament demanded the resignation of the government, the parliament was free to decide on this resignation. However, since the political parties (with the exception of independent candidates) usually nominated the candidates for the parliamentary elections themselves, they played the all-important role in the process of elite formation in the background. That is to say, the political parties gained considerable importance in the power-building process. The political game thus became more complicated, its rules began to become considerably more refined.

The previous parliament, the Grand People's Assembly, had 430 seats. That is, the MRVP also gained a wide space for its political game through the large number of mandates. In 1992, after the adoption of the Basic Democratic Law, the MRVP had to concentrate on winning as many as possible of the 76 mandates in the election of the Grand State Assembly in order to be able to implement its policies at all. Compared to the time before, the opposition seemed to have become a serious rival, against which the MRVP was able to score well with its administrative competence. But it was not this competence alone that put them in an advantageous position. The fact that its party members occupied all the important posts in every segment of the administrative apparatus was an important guarantee of success. Little had changed in this respect since 1990. 

After the convincing victory in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the MRVP networks regained their self-confidence. It continued to govern in its usual centralist manner. Nevertheless, the performance of the MRVP networks no longer radiated the earlier monolithic character of the state party. However, the new MRVP leadership, composed mainly of social scientists from former MRVP party institutes, managed under its chairman B. Dash-Yondon to hold the party together, to elegantly abandon its former ideology, Marxism/Leninism, and to stabilise the party more strongly overall. Nevertheless, no one in this leadership had been a real and even charismatic leader figure. The party leadership at this time rather gave the impression of a relatively wise council of elders who were respected and recognised, but whose authority was not fed by personal superiority, but rather by more moral or intellectual qualities that were only valid at that specific moment. Measured against the times, however, this was very important, since it was a matter of securing for the MRVP both authority and the claim to legitimacy of its actions.

The MRVP had its cabinet formed under P. Jasrai, who had earlier been a member of the "economists' faction" and chairman of the State Planning Commission. P. Jasrai was a good administrator with a keen sense of business affairs and was well suited to the situation where the main concern was to manage the state in a semi-reliable manner. 

In P. Jasrai's cabinet, the number of ministries had increased to 16 compared to 11 ministries + one state committee in 1990. The average age of the members of the government was about 45 years. Five ministers were under 40 years old. One of them was Culture Minister N. Enkhbayar, who will be discussed later. Most of the government members belonged to the middle management level of the party or the state as leadership cadres before 1990. Three ministers had been deputy heads of CC departments and two cabinet members had been deputy ministers during this period. The professional profiles of most ministers corresponded to the portfolios they represented. Four members of the government, Prime Minister P. Jasrai, Deputy Prime Minister L. Enebish, Foreign Minister Ts. Gombosüren and Culture Minister N. Enkhbayar were also members of parliament.

During its last years 1995-1996, the government of P. Jasraj had often referred to the slowly emerging economic stabilisation as a merit of its policy. In fact, however, it deliberately overlooked the fact that this development would never have come about without the analytical support and financial assistance of international donors. A negative side effect of this development was undoubtedly that corruption ate its way into all levels of the poorly paid state administration and above all into all segments of the privatisation process with, at present, irreversible consequences. This process intensified from the end of 1993 onwards, creating a foundation for corruption and bribery, as well as the formation of links between politics and business. One group of people began to enrich themselves more than others from the assets of the former "material-technical basis of socialism". It was obvious that this would also have repercussions for the party.

Prime Minister P. Jasrai set about stabilising the civil service with a view to the 1996 parliamentary elections. Stabilising the civil service was clearly a question of power, since most of his employees were members of the MRVP. On the one hand, they were the guarantors of the functioning of the executive, and on the other hand, they represented a large and special electoral clientele, which after 1990 had to eke out an existence with miserable salaries and in which there was great fluctuation. This should now change. The Grand State Assembly, dominated by MPs from the MRVP faction, passed the first "Civil Service Act" in the last days of 1994, which was followed by further laws and amendments in the following year. The essential point was that the hierarchy in the civil service and its financial, significantly more attractive endowment were redefined. The new laws were intended to bring stability and attractiveness to the civil service. Prime Minister P. Jasrai and the inner circle expected the civil servants to be grateful to the party and committed to their work, but always in favour of the MRVP. The real strategic intention, however, was to create a state bureaucracy that was loyal to the MRVP, stable and sustainable in the medium term. The MRVP was to once again become the immovable centre of state omnipotence…